Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations: SOR/2026-30

Canada Gazette, Part II, Volume 160, Number 5

Registration
SOR/2026-30 February 19, 2026

SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES ACT

P.C. 2026-139 February 19, 2026

Whereas the Governor in Council is of the opinion that the actions of the Russian Federation constitute a grave breach of international peace and security that has resulted in a serious international crisis;

Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes the annexed Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations under paragraph 4(1)(a)footnote a and subsections 4(1.1)footnote b, (2)footnote c and (3) of the Special Economic Measures Act footnote d.

Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations

Amendments

1 Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations footnote 1 is amended by adding the following in numerical order:

2 Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following in numerical order:

3 The portion of item 333 of Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
333 2009
4 The portion of item 336 of Schedule 1.1 to the English version of the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
336 2000
5 The portion of item 343 of Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
343 2006
6 The portion of item 353 of Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
353 2006
7 The portion of items 362 and 363 of Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
362 2003
363 2007
8 The portion of item 370 of Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
370 2000
9 The portion of item 384 of Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations in the column under the heading “Build date” is replaced by the following:
Item Build date
384 2005
10 Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following in numerical order:
Item IMO number Vessel name Type Build date
411 9435337 Akhty Chemical/Products Tanker 2008
412 9327360 Aria Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
413 9377042 Armada Explorer Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
414 9282493 Asteri Oil Tanker 2005
415 9387255 Azure Oil Tanker 2008
416 9621560 Bavly Oil Products Tanker 2013
417 9266865 Bivola Oil Tanker 2004
418 9273442 Blue Ember Oil Products Tanker 2004
419 9389679 Bullar Oil Tanker 2008
420 9436020 Centurion I Oil Tanker 2010
421 9259745 Eternal Peace Oil Tanker 2004
422 9408530 Evita Oil Tanker 2008
423 9459242 Feliks Oil Products Tanker 2010
424 9224441 Firn Oil Tanker 2002
425 9395379 Fortis Oil Tanker 2008
426 9326718 Fulger Oil Tanker 2007
427 9257802 Furia Oil Tanker 2002
428 9537109 Gazpromneft Zuid East Oil Products Tanker 2012
429 9185528 Gelor Oil Tanker 2000
430 9430210 Gogland Chemical/Products Tanker 2018
431 9255684 Golden Eagle Oil Tanker 2004
432 9261619 Hannah Oil Tanker 2003
433 9056571 Immanuel Oil Products Tanker 1995
434 9435375 Irtysh River Chemical/Products Tanker 2009
435 9876359 Ivan Aivazovsky Chemical/Products Tanker 2025
436 9313498 Jacklyn Oil Tanker 2008
437 9402732 Jewel 1 Oil Tanker 2008
438 9281009 Ji Hang Oil Tanker 2004
439 9397535 Jupiter Chemical/Products Tanker 2009
440 9236004 Kairos Oil Tanker 2002
441 9585924 Kaluga Chemical/Products Tanker 2021
442 9372559 Kapitan Gotsky Oil Tanker 2008
443 9260275 Katran Chemical/Products Tanker 2004
444 9333682 Kirill Lavrov Oil Tanker 2010
445 9299161 Kord Atlantic Chemical/Products Tanker 2004
446 9749154 Kupava Chemical/Products Tanker 2017
447 9189146 Kylo Oil Tanker 2001
448 9255672 Lebre Oil Tanker 2004
449 9385831 Leruo Oil Products Tanker 2010
450 9294331 Lily Oil Tanker 2005
451 9384069 Lion I Oil Tanker 2009
452 9292838 Listiga Oil Products Tanker 2005
453 9247443 Magnus Oil Tanker 2003
454 9424651 Manta Oil Products Tanker 2009
455 9323974 Marble Oil Tanker 2006
456 9247376 Mariel Oil Tanker 2002
457 9585912 Marlin Chemical/Products Tanker 2020
458 9315745 Marquise Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
459 9384992 Mars 6 Oil Tanker 2007
460 9590137 Megion Oil Products Tanker 2011
461 9837547 Mikhail Lazarev Oil Tanker 2019
462 9333670 Mikhail Ulyanov Oil Tanker 2010
463 9389095 Minion Oil Tanker 2009
464 9299771 Mires Oil Tanker 2005
465 9296810 Missoni Oil Tanker 2005
466 9297553 Monte 1 Oil Tanker 2006
467 9113276 MT Konstantinovsk Oil Products Tanker 1994
468 9167930 Murmansk Oil Products Tanker 1998
469 9292577 Nexus Oil Products Tanker 2005
470 9942392 Nikolay Anishchenkov General Cargo 2023
471 8821761 Nimbus SPB Oil Products Tanker 1991
472 9151890 Odin Chemical/Products Tanker 1998
473 9142916 Okean Oil Products Tanker 1996
474 9286463 Olanga Oil Products Tanker 2004
475 9418509 Omsk Oil Products Tanker 2008
476 9236640 Onyx Chemical/Products Tanker 2003
477 9286023 Opal Oil Tanker 2004
478 9314820 Osar Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
479 9224805 Oxis Oil Tanker 2001
480 9329667 Pacific Chemical/Products Tanker 2008
481 8700096 Partizansk Oil Products Tanker 1988
482 9276028 Pegasus Chemical/Products Tanker 2004
483 9630028 Perle LNG Tanker 2014
484 9276561 Petra Oil Tanker 2004
485 9266877 Pierre Oil Tanker 2004
486 9236743 Primorye Oil Products Tanker 2001
487 9329655 Proxima Chemical/Products Tanker 2008
488 9384095 Ragnar Chemical/Products Tanker 2008
489 9206671 Rangler Oil Tanker 2001
490 9306562 Rhein Oil Tanker 2005
491 9650016 RN Sakhalin Oil Products Tanker 2018
492 9308857 Rymo Oil Tanker 2006
493 9286281 Samadha Oil Tanker 2004
494 9315654 Sea Honor Oil Tanker 2005
495 9321172 Sea Owl I Oil Tanker 2007
496 9266750 Seahorse Oil Tanker 2004
497 9308950 Seasons I Oil Tanker 2006
498 9752084 Shturman Albanov Oil Tanker 2016
499 9759939 Shturman Koshelev Oil Tanker 2017
500 9752096 Shturman Malygin Oil Tanker 2016
501 9752101 Shturman Ovtsyn Oil Tanker 2016
502 9759927 Shturman Shcherbinin Oil Tanker 2017
503 9759915 Shturman Skuratov Oil Tanker 2017
504 9309576 Silver Chemical/Products Tanker 2005
505 9389100 Smyrtos Oil Tanker 2009
506 9211999 Sofia Oil Tanker 2000
507 9409259 Spirit 2 Oil Tanker 2008
508 9386536 Spring Fortune Oil Tanker 2009
509 9434890 Vokki Oil Tanker 2010
510 9377779 Vozrozhdeniye Oil Tanker 2007

11 Item 2 of Schedule 3 to the Regulations is repealed.

12 The portion of item 1 of Schedule 10.01 to the Regulations in column 3 is replaced by the following:
Item

Column 3

Price Cap (USD per Barrel)
1 $44.10

Application Before Publication

13 For the purpose of paragraph 11(2)(a) of the Statutory Instruments Act, these Regulations apply according to their terms before they are published in the Canada Gazette.

Transitional Provision

14 Item 1 of Schedule 10.01 to the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, as it read immediately before the day on which these Regulations come into force, continues to apply, for a period of 45 days after that day, in respect of goods loaded onto a ship before that day.

Coming into Force

15 These Regulations come into force on the day on which they are registered.

REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS STATEMENT

(This statement is not part of the Regulations.)

Issues

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine violates international law and has upended the European security architecture. While international sanctions have been effective in hampering Russia’s war efforts, maintaining pressure requires Canada and its partners to continuously adapt their sanctions regimes to counter Russia’s attempts at circumvention.

Background

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, violated the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law. More than four years later, the war persists with ongoing aggression and atrocities.

To sustain the conflict, Russia has restructured its economy around military spending and self-sufficiency in strategic sectors. In May 2025, President Putin outlined plans to modernize Russia’s military through artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled technologies, foreign partnerships and expanded domestic production — efforts that could strengthen capabilities in energy, technology and finance.

Central to this effort is Russia’s AI strategy, driven by state corporations and supported by academia, industry and select international partners. Russia exercises robust, centralized oversight of its AI industry, through strong state direction and control of research institutes, design bureaus and scientific production enterprises, and state-industry collaboration and integration. This approach leverages government programs and the technological sector to accelerate military innovation and production, both in conventional capabilities and hybrid sectors, to be used in its unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine.

Russia’s efforts depend on access to restricted components and financial networks. Sanctions evasion remains a major concern, as Russian importers use third-country intermediaries and complex transshipment networks to secure critical goods, requiring persistent enforcement and international coordination. Financial flows also enable the war. Russia moves funds abroad for arms and receives energy revenues through intermediary banks and cryptocurrency.

Despite sanctions, oil and gas revenues made up about 25% of Russia’s total federal revenues in 2025. To bypass restrictions, Russia relies on a “shadow fleet” mainly composed of oil tankers that disable tracking, conceal ownership, and engages in covert transfers and cargo mislabelling via free trade zones. Given the importance of oil and gas revenue to Russia’s economy and its war effort, Canada and the members of the Oil Price Cap Coalition have sought to limit Russian access to revenue from the energy sector through various measures.

International response

Canada and its partners, including the G7, have maintained coordinated pressure on Russia through comprehensive sanctions targeting its energy sector, financial networks, maritime logistics, and defence-industrial base. These measures aim to degrade Russia’s war machine and financing capabilities.

A broad coalition of countries supporting Ukraine — largely coordinated by G7 efforts — continues to assist across multiple areas: energy security, nuclear safety, food security, humanitarian aid, combating Russian disinformation, imposing sanctions and economic measures, asset seizure and forfeiture, military assistance, accountability initiatives, and socio-economic recovery and reconstruction. Sanctions regimes are regularly updated to increase pressure and close loopholes exploited by Russia and third-country enablers.

Recent sanctions measures underscore continued international resolve. On October 15, 2025, the United Kingdom (U.K.) announced economic measures targeting energy firms (including Lukoil and Rosneft, both already sanctioned by Canada), Russia’s defence-industrial base and sanctions evaders. On October 22, 2025, the United States also sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil, along with 35 subsidiaries, and tightened export controls. On October 23, 2025, the European Union (EU) introduced sanctions that mirrored these priorities and added individuals linked to the abduction of Ukrainian children. Most recently, on December 4, 2025, the U.K. announced measures targeting Russian military intelligence assets, notably by imposing sanctions on the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) following their egregious acts on British soil and ongoing hybrid warfare operations.

In order to constrain Russia’s oil and gas revenues, which are critical to its economy and war effort, Canada lowered the price cap for Russian crude oil from US$60 to US$47.60 per barrel, effective August 28, 2025, alongside partners, including Australia, the EU, Japan, New Zealand and the U.K. On January 15, 2026, the EU and the UK further lowered the Russian crude oil price cap (OPC) to US$44.10 per barrel.

Canada’s response

Canada has imposed extensive sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) in response to Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty. These measures prohibit dealings with listed individuals, entities and vessels under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (the Russia Regulations), effectively freezing assets and restricting transactions, services and goods.

Since 2014, Canada has sanctioned more than 3 300 individuals and entities across Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and listed over 400 vessels. Restrictions target financial, trade and transport sectors, including Russian networks operating through third countries. Canada also participates in the G7 diamond import ban and efforts to use proceeds from Russian sovereign assets to support Ukraine.

Furthermore, Canada has acted against foreign financial institutions for intentionally facilitating cross-border payments and continues to restrict the role of Russian banks as intermediaries.

Under the Russia Regulations, Canada prohibits the import of any Russian crude oil, refined petroleum products and gaseous hydrocarbons, and prohibits the export of goods related to oil exploration and production in Russia. Canada also restricts services linked to marine transport of oil sold above the price cap and broadly prohibits services supporting Russia’s energy, manufacturing and transportation sectors.

To strengthen enforcement, Canada has barred Russian-linked ships from Canadian waters since 2022, with 2025 amendments to the Russia Regulations adding a schedule of vessels believed to have transported goods for Russia and prohibiting financial or other services related to these ships. Under Canada’s G7 presidency, participating G7 members launched a Shadow Fleet Task Force with members of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden, to enhance monitoring, detection and coordination to disrupt and deter the global shadow fleet engaged in illegal, unsafe and environmentally hazardous activities.

Furthermore, during its G7 Presidency in 2025, Canada continued to lead efforts to coordinate sanctions, enhance enforcement, and advance measures that limit Russia’s ability to finance its war. On October 1, 2025, G7 Finance Ministers agreed to take bold steps to increase the economic costs of Russia’s war efforts by imposing restrictive measures on key sectors and supporters of the Russian economy, such as energy, finance, the military industrial base, special economic zones, and enablers and profiteers. This will cut off the funds sustaining Russia’s military aggression and will have a powerful impact on those who violate those restrictive measures. They also agreed that now is the time to maximize pressure on Russia’s oil exports, a major source of their revenue. Canada is and will remain steadfast in its commitment to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and its efforts toward a just and sustainable peace.

Objective

  1. Degrade Russia’s conventional and hybrid military capabilities used against Ukraine in Russia’s war of aggression.
  2. Further increase the economic costs to Russia for its war against Ukraine by targeting Russia’s energy revenues and financial enablers.

Description

The Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (the amendments):

Any person in Canada or Canadians outside Canada are prohibited from dealing in the property of, entering into transactions with, providing services to, transferring property to, or otherwise making goods available to listed individuals and entities (persons), unless explicitly authorized by a permit granted on an exceptional basis or an exception in the Russia Regulations. Listed individuals are also rendered inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

Under the Russia Regulations, listed persons may apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have their name removed from the Schedule of designated persons. The Minister must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to make a recommendation to the Governor in Council for removal. Information on the delisting application process is available on Global Affairs Canada’s website.

Regulatory development

Consultation

Global Affairs Canada regularly engages with relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations and cultural communities, and other like-minded governments regarding Canada’s approach to sanctions implementation.

New sanctions measures are not prepublished in the Canada Gazette, Part I, and public consultation would not have been appropriate for these amendments. Publicizing the names of the listed persons targeted by sanctions could have resulted in asset flight and sanctions evasion prior to the coming into force of the amendments, which could compromise Canada’s foreign policy objectives.

Indigenous engagement, consultation and modern treaty obligations

In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on the Federal Approach to Modern Treaty Implementation, an analysis was undertaken to determine whether the amendments are likely to give rise to modern treaty obligations. The assessment examined the geographic scope and subject matter of the amendments in relation to modern treaties in effect, and no modern treaty obligations were identified.

Instrument choice

The imposition of sanctions against foreign states and non-state actors is a key tool for the international community to support peace and security and enforce international norms and laws. The Parliament of Canada has enacted legislation authorizing the imposition of sanctions through the United Nations Act, the SEMA and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law).

Canada has established a rigorous due diligence process to consider and evaluate possible cases that may warrant the use of sanctions. Given the elements in the amendments, the SEMA was identified as the instrument of choice.

Sanctions measures under the SEMA are imposed by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, through a regulatory process. Regulations are therefore the only available legal instrument for the amendments. No other instrument could be considered.

Regulatory analysis

Benefits and costs

These amendments will strengthen existing economic measures against Russia, constrain Russia’s ability to finance and resource its unjustified war in Ukraine, and discourage individuals and entities from contributing, directly or indirectly, to Russia’s war efforts.

The incremental cost to the Government of Canada to administer and enforce these additional prohibitions will be minimal. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada will incur a small cost to ensure their relevant systems include the persons and vessels listed through this amendment.

Canadian banks and financial institutions are required to comply with sanctions. They will do so by adding the newly listed individuals, entities and ships to their existing monitoring systems, resulting in a minor compliance cost. As of August 2024, financial institutions must report transactions suspected of being related to sanctions evasion to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). Financial institutions also have other legal obligations with respect to the monitoring and reporting of relevant property ownership, export and import of goods and other activities in connection with sanctioned individuals and entities.

Sanctions targeting specific persons have less impact on Canadian businesses than traditional broad-based economic sanctions. Based on an initial assessment of available open-source information and consultations within the Government of Canada, it is believed that most of the individuals and entities listed in the amendments have limited linkages with Canada and do not have business dealings that are significant to the Canadian economy. However, available information suggests that some persons proposed for listing may have connections with Canada, which could result in impacts on certain companies. Potential impacts could include company relocation, employment losses, reduced taxation and spending, contraction of operations, revenue impacts and sale of assets.

The amendments related to the listing of vessels are not expected to result in incremental impacts on Canada. Since 2022, the Russia Regulations have banned certain ships from docking in or passing through Canada. This applies to all ships registered in Russia or used, leased or chartered, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia, a person in Russia or a listed person. While the amendments do not introduce new prohibitions, listing the 100 identified vessels will facilitate the enforcement of the general prohibition on docking and passage in Canada. Without the names of the vessels in Schedule 1.1, enforcement authorities must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a vessel is subject to the general prohibition. Schedule 1.1 provides a predetermination of status for a category of vessels that can be used to identify them for purposes of denying them docking and passage.

All Canadian companies providing services related to vessels, such as insurance, technical services or ship supply services, will be required to screen against Schedule 1.1 to ensure that they are not providing a service in relation to a listed vessel. There is no data available to ascertain if any Canadian businesses are currently providing services in relation to listed vessels. However, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has concluded that it is highly unlikely because there is no record of these vessels entering Canada, and none of the vessels are owned, managed, operated or insured by Canadian companies.

Based on an assessment of available open-source information and consultations within the Government of Canada, it is believed that the lower OPC for crude oil is unlikely to cause significant spikes in the price of crude oil. Given that Canada already prohibits the direct import of Russian oil and petroleum products, it is unlikely that lowering the OPC will have a direct impact on Canada or Canadian businesses. Canadian oil is primarily exported to the United States. Canadian oil exports on the Trans Mountain Pipeline are sold to markets that also import Russian oil. However, Canada and Russia export different crude grades that do not directly compete, so it is unlikely that changes to Russian oil flows will have a direct impact on Canadian businesses. Global Affairs Canada does not have data to ascertain if any Canadian businesses are currently providing maritime insurance or financial services to tankers transporting Russian oil above the new OPC. However, given Canada’s existing sanctions in relation to Russian oil transactions, it is highly unlikely that any Canadian businesses currently provide such services.

Russian seaborne exports are around 9% of global supply, which is significant. Global oil markets and the Canadian economy could be impacted if a large volume of Russian seaborne oil exports is taken off the market. However, reports from the International Energy Agency show that the market is well supplied, with weak demand growth and growing supply from both the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC suppliers. Significant impacts on the global oil market are considered unlikely given current market conditions.

Small business lens

Analysis under the small business lens concludes that the amendments will not impact Canadian small businesses. The amendments listing new individuals and entities do not impose any new compliance or administrative burden on small businesses in Canada. Additionally, given that Canada already prohibits the import of Russian oil and petroleum products, it is unlikely that Canadian companies provide services related to the movement of Russian oil.

Canadian businesses may seek permits under the Special Economic Measures Permit Authorization Order to allow them to perform a specified activity with a listed person. Those permits are granted on an exceptional basis. Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any applications resulting from listing these persons or ships because no business dealings significant to Canada’s small businesses have been identified.

Canadian small businesses are subject to the duty to disclose under the Russia Regulations, which represent a direct compliance requirement. However, the newly listed individuals, entities and ships have no known legitimate linkages with Canadian small businesses. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any Canadian small businesses currently provide services related to the movement of Russian oil, as there is no record of these tankers entering Canada and as there is no data available to ascertain any links with Canadian small businesses. This is why Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any disclosures resulting from the amendments.

One-for-one rule

The one-for-one rule does not apply, as there is no incremental change in administrative burden on business. The permitting process for businesses meets the definition of “administrative burden” in the Red Tape Reduction Act. As permits may be granted under the Special Economic Measures Permit Authorization Order on an exceptional basis, it is possible that some businesses currently dealing with the newly listed entities will seek permits to continue such activity.

Regulatory cooperation and alignment

While the amendments are not related to a work plan or commitment under a formal regulatory cooperation forum, they align with actions taken by Canada’s partners. Countries and jurisdictions that have sanctioned individuals, entities and vessels related to Russia’s infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as Russia’s gross and systematic violations of human rights include Australia, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the U.K. and the United States.

International obligations

Compliance with Canada’s international commitments was considered in the development of the amendments.

Effects on the environment

The amendments are unlikely to result in important environmental effects. In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on Strategic Environmental and Economic Assessment, a preliminary scan concluded that an environmental and economic assessment is not required.

Gender-based analysis plus

A gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) assessment concluded that the amendments are unlikely to result in differential impacts on the basis of identity factors, such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, etc.

The subject of economic sanctions has previously been assessed for effects on gender and diversity. Although intended to facilitate a change in behaviour through economic pressure on individuals and entities in foreign states, sanctions under the SEMA can nevertheless have an unintended impact on certain vulnerable groups and individuals. Rather than affecting Russia as a whole, these targeted sanctions impact individuals believed to be engaged in activities that directly or indirectly support, provide funding for or contribute to a violation of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine. Therefore, these sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact on vulnerable groups as compared to traditional broad-based economic sanctions directed toward a state. Insofar as sanctions limit Russia’s ability to wage war, individuals and groups vulnerable to gender-based discrimination are likely to benefit from these measures.

Implementation, compliance and enforcement, and service standards

The amendments come into force on the day they are registered. The amendments include a 45-day non-application period for the revised OPC in respect of services provided in relation to goods that were loaded onto a vessel and unloaded at the port of destination within 45 days after the day the amendments are registered.

Consequential to being listed in the Russia Regulations, and pursuant to the application of paragraph 35.1(b) of the IRPA, the listed individuals would be inadmissible to Canada.

The names of the listed individuals and entities will be available online for financial institutions to review and will be added to the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. This will help persons in Canada and Canadians outside of Canada to comply with the amendments.

The Trade Commissioner Service at Global Affairs Canada, abroad and in Canada, continues to assist clients in understanding Canadian sanctions regulations, and notably the impact of the regulations on any activities in which Canadians may be engaged. Global Affairs Canada is also increasing outreach efforts across Canada through presentations and other events — including to engage with businesses, universities, and provincial/territorial governments — to enhance national awareness of and compliance with Canadian sanctions.

The prohibitions on ships entering or passing through Canada are enforced by a multi-departmental process involving Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, the CBSA, the RCMP and others. These partners were consulted during the development of the amendments.

Under the SEMA, both RCMP and CBSA officers have the power to enforce sanctions measures through their authorities as defined under the Customs Act, the Excise Act or the Excise Act, 2001, and sections 487 to 490, 491.1 and 491.2 of the Criminal Code.

In accordance with section 8 of the SEMA, every person who knowingly contravenes or fails to comply with the Russia Regulations is liable, upon summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both: or, upon conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

Contact

Global Affairs Canada
Sanctions Bureau
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0G2
Telephone (toll-free): 1‑833‑352‑0769
Telephone (local): 343‑203‑3975
Fax: 613‑995‑9085
Email: sanctions@international.gc.ca