Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations: SOR/2025-228

Canada Gazette, Part II, Volume 159, Number 24

Registration
SOR/2025-228 November 6, 2025

SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES ACT

P.C. 2025-790 November 6, 2025

Whereas the Governor in Council is of the opinion that the actions of the Russian Federation constitute a grave breach of international peace and security that has resulted in a serious international crisis;

Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes the annexed Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations under paragraph 4(1)(a)footnote a and subsections 4(1.1)footnote b, (2)footnote c and (3) of the Special Economic Measures Act footnote d.

Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations

Amendments

1 Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations footnote 1 is amended by adding the following in numerical order:

2 Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following in numerical order:

3 The portion of items 15, 21, 23, 41, 57, 60, 61, 77, 80, 87 to 89, 100, 101, 116, 120, 128, 158, 194, 195, 231, 242, 278, 280, 281 and 287 of Schedule 1.1 to the French version of the Regulations in the column under the heading “Type” is amended by replacing “Pétrolier” with “Navire-citerne pour produits pétroliers”.

4 The portion of item 251 of Schedule 1.1 to the English version of the Regulations in the column under the heading “Type” is amended by replacing “Other” with “Oil Tanker”.

5 Schedule 1.1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following in numerical order:
Item IMO number Vessel name Type Build date
311 9242223 Adonia Oil Tanker 2003
312 9842190 Akademik Gubkin Oil Tanker 2023
313 9385142 Almond Chemical/Products Tanker 2009
314 9257993 Amell Oil Tanker 2003
315 9381744 Antila Oil Tanker 2008
316 9280885 Apus Oil Tanker 2004
317 9299745 Apus Oil Tanker 2006
318 9299769 Aquatica Oil Tanker 2005
319 9281152 Aquila II Oil Tanker 2004
320 9397547 Ariadne Chemical/Products Tanker 2008
321 9163764 Arno Babajanyan Chemical/Products Tanker 1999
322 9273387 Astra Chemical/Products Tanker 2003
323 9381732 Auga Oil Tanker 2008
324 9233765 Aulis Oil Tanker 2003
325 9164512 Avior Oil Products Tanker 1999
326 9322839 Avril Oil Tanker 2006
327 9308821 Berra Oil Tanker 2005
328 9323338 Bettle Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
329 9495832 Blacksea Eagle Oil Products Tanker 2008
330 9411331 Canara Oil Tanker 2009
331 9299680 Cangjie Oil Tanker 2005
332 9380673 Centurion Oil Tanker 2008
333 9418482 Cetus Oil Tanker 2013
334 9171175 Cilicia Oil Products Tanker 2000
335 9589750 Danshui Oil Tanker 2011
336 9194983 Deliver Oil Tanker 2006
337 9253894 Destamar Oil Tanker 2002
338 9299903 Deyna Oil Tanker 2005
339 9283241 Dignity Oil Tanker 2004
340 9683726 Dmitry Pokrovsky Oil Products Tanker 2014
341 9383950 Eminent Oil Tanker 2009
342 9079169 Enisey Bulk carrier 1995
343 9308065 Eventin Oil Tanker 2008
344 9283306 Fina A Oil Tanker 2004
345 9238052 Freya Oil Tanker 2002
346 9288851 Grinch Oil Tanker 2004
347 9419448 Heng Tai Oil Tanker 2009
348 9249087 Hs Glory Oil Tanker 2005
349 9312872 HuiHai Atlantic Oil Tanker 2007
350 9256858 Inda Oil Tanker 2003
351 9337133 Ivy Oil Tanker 2007
352 9301392 Kapitan Kostichev Oil Tanker 2005
353 9306782 Kareliya Oil Tanker 2008
354 9327413 Karol Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
355 9258002 Kazan Oil Tanker 2003
356 9412995 Kruger Oil Tanker 2009
357 9339313 Ladoga Oil Tanker 2007
358 9683740 Lady Leila Oil Products Tanker 2014
359 9683738 Lady Sevda Oil Products Tanker 2014
360 9258521 Lauren II Oil Tanker 2004
361 9259599 Lauryn Oil Tanker 2003
362 9256066 Ligovsky Prospect Oil Tanker 2005
363 9339301 Lipetsk Oil Tanker 2006
364 9256078 Liteyny Prospect Oil Tanker 2003
365 9392822 Lotus Oil Tanker 2008
366 9314088 Lyra Oil Tanker 2004
367 9289477 M Sophia Oil Tanker 2004
368 9314105 Makalu Oil Tanker 2005
369 9378632 Malak Oil Tanker 2009
370 9198783 Maria Oil Tanker 2010
371 9187227 Meru Oil Tanker 2000
372 9314818 Miley Chemical/Products Tanker 2006
373 9257137 Min Hang Oil Tanker 2003
374 9233741 Mitzel Oil Tanker 2003
375 9934498 Nan Feng Zhi Xing Heavy Load Carrier 2022
376 9224283 Neer 1 Oil Tanker 2002
377 9256054 Nevskiy Prospect Oil Tanker 2003
378 9266853 New Power Oil Tanker 2004
379 9297357 Novator Oil Tanker 2006
380 9255270 Np Dikson Chemical/Products Tanker 2004
381 9183831 Np Dudinka Chemical/Products Tanker 2000
382 9284594 Ocean River Oil Tanker 2004
383 9268112 Olia Oil Tanker 2003
384 9299719 Otla Oil Tanker 2006
385 9284582 Panda Oil Tanker 2004
386 9378618 Pioner 1 Oil Tanker 2008
387 9350654 Ruby Cross Oil Tanker 2007
388 9524451 Sabina Oil Tanker 2011
389 9322267 Sahara Oil Tanker 2007
390 9530917 Sakina Oil Tanker 2013
391 9300348 Sanar-10 Oil Products Tanker 2004
392 9777670 Sanar-15 Oil Products Tanker 2015
393 9300350 Sanar-9 Oil Products Tanker 2005
394 9301615 Sara II Chemical/Products Tanker 2004
395 9524463 Satara Oil Tanker 2011
396 9296585 Sensus Oil Products Tanker 2005
397 9419137 Sikar Oil Tanker 2010
398 9285847 Sirius 1 Oil Tanker 2005
399 9274446 Sorion Oil Tanker 2004
400 9315446 Spring Oil Tanker 2005
401 9259197 Thalia III Oil Tanker 2003
402 9388754 Trader Oil Tanker 2008
403 9247780 Turaco Oil Tanker 2003
404 9621601 Vasily Lanovoy Chemical/Products Tanker 2016
405 9832547 Velmar Oil Tanker 2018
406 9233349 Vesna Oil Tanker 2000
407 9271327 View Oil Tanker 2003
408 9832559 Virat Oil Tanker 2018
409 9255244 White Condor I Oil Products Tanker 2003
410 9231212 Xanthos Eos Oil Tanker 2002

Application Before Publication

6 For the purpose of paragraph 11(2)(a) of the Statutory Instruments Act, these Regulations apply according to their terms before they are published in the Canada Gazette.

Coming into Force

7 These Regulations come into force on the day on which they are registered.

REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS STATEMENT

(This statement is not part of the Regulations.)

Issues

Russia continues its war against Ukraine, blatantly violating international law and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In addition to its military operations, Russia applies its hybrid (military and non-military) strategies against Ukraine and the international community, including through cyber operations. Russia continues to finance its war and military industrial base, including artificial intelligence, through energy revenues coming from sanctions evasion, enablers and profiteers in third countries. These actors directly support the Kremlin in moving funds in and out of Russia to pay for arms and other war-related material, and via the use of a shadow fleet (i.e. a network of vessels and various supporting entities around the world) involved in the movement of petroleum products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), arms and other items for the benefit of Russia. LNG exports and related revenues remain a critical source of funding for Russia’s military-industrial complex.

To discourage these behaviours and practices, the Government of Canada is imposing additional economic measures on those responsible for the above actions and practices.

Background

On February 24, 2022, Russia initiated an unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law. Three and a half years later, Russia continues to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine and to commit atrocities against Ukrainians.

As of August 2025, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has confirmed that at least 13 883 civilians have been killed and over 35 548 have been injured since February 24, 2022. Despite extensive sanctions, Russia has adapted by leveraging cyber actors, entities supporting its military industrial base, shadow fleet vessels and financial intermediaries to sustain its war effort.

Russia has continued to be able to move funds out of the country to pay for arms and related material, and to move funds into the country as payment for exports of energy products. This has, in part, been accomplished through the use of banks in intermediary jurisdictions, also known as Foreign Financial Institutions (FFIs). Several countries, including Canada, have taken action against at least one FFI for intentionally facilitating cross-border payments and continue to take measures to restrict the role of Russian banks as intermediaries.

Oil and gas revenue has traditionally constituted a significant percentage of Russia’s total government revenue. Although economic measures taken by Canada and its partners, including G7 members, have reduced the revenues available to Russia to fund the ongoing war, oil and gas revenues continue to account for roughly 30% of all Russian government revenues.

To evade and circumvent sanctions, especially those on its oil and gas exports, Russia has increasingly made use of a shadow fleet to transport sanctioned goods and commodities. These vessels often intentionally disable or manipulate their automatic identification systems (AIS); have substandard maintenance; frequently change ownership in a covert manner; have inadequate insurance coverage; and engage in dangerous ship-to-ship transfers, mislabelling or blending the cargoes for re-export, often in free trade zone ports, to avoid foreign jurisdictions.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) highlights several indicators of possible shadow fleet activity.

  1. AIS tampering — disabling or manipulating tracking systems to hide movements.
  2. Flags of convenience — frequent reflagging with states lacking enforcement.
  3. Unrecognized insurance — operating without standard marine insurance.
  4. Poor vessel condition — aging ships failing safety and environmental standards.
  5. Hidden ownership — use of shell companies to obscure true ownership;
  6. Suspicious routes — ship-to-ship transfers in poorly monitored areas.
  7. Port avoidance — skipping ports with strict inspections or failing them.

International response

Canada’s partners, including G7 and European Union (EU) members, have continued to impose coordinated and aligned sanctions measures targeting Russia’s energy sector, financial networks and maritime logistics. International efforts also focus on countering cyber threats and sanction circumvention through shadow fleets.

A group of countries directly supporting Ukraine, including but not limited to the G7 and European countries, is working to support Ukraine across several areas, including by contributing to energy security, nuclear safety, food security, humanitarian assistance, combatting Russian disinformation, imposing sanctions and economic measures, asset seizure and forfeiture, providing military assistance, ensuring accountability and fostering socio-economic recovery and reconstruction.

Key international partners have continued to update their sanctions regimes to increase pressure on Russia through coordinated efforts towards these ends.

The IMO Resolution “A.1192(33) — Urging Member States and All Relevant Stakeholders to Promote Actions to Prevent Illegal Operations in the Maritime Sector by the ‘Dark Fleet’ or ‘Shadow Fleet’” calls on states to take a range of actions to prevent this type of activity. Canada has signed a United Kingdom-led call to action on the shadow fleet, which has been signed by 50 other states. The international coalition supporting Ukraine has increased efforts to counter the shadow fleet by enhancing maritime surveillance, sanctioning vessels involved and undertaking outreach with industry, flag states and port states.

Canada’s response

Canada unequivocally condemns Russia’s unjustified and egregious actions. Following Russia’s unjustified occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Government of Canada, in tandem with like-minded countries, enacted sanctions through regulations under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA). These sanctions impose dealings prohibitions (an effective asset freeze) on listed individuals and entities supporting or enabling Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Any person in Canada and Canadians outside Canada are prohibited from dealing in the property of, entering into transactions with, providing services to, or otherwise making goods available to persons listed under schedules 1, 2 or 3 of the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (the Russia Regulations). In addition, Canada has put in place a wide range of other economic restrictions under the Russia Regulations. These include a prohibition on certain types of ships entering or passing through Canada. In February 2025, to support enforcement of this general prohibition, Schedule 1.1 was established to list ships specifically identified by their IMO number.

Since 2014, in coordination with its partners, Canada has imposed sanctions on more than 3 300 individuals and entities in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and has listed over 300 vessels. This includes sanctions addressing Russian networks in third countries, as well as entities that are supporting Russia in these regions. Canada has also implemented targeted restrictions against Russia and Belarus in financial, trade (goods and services) and transport sectors. Canada is part of the G7 diamond import ban and ongoing efforts to use the proceeds from Russian sovereign assets to help Ukraine. Canada is steadfast in its commitment to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and its efforts toward a just and sustainable peace.

Given the importance of oil and gas revenue to Russia’s economy and its war effort, Canada and G7 partners have sought to limit Russian access to revenue from the energy sector through various measures. Canada is part of the Oil Price Cap Coalition. Canada prohibits the import of any Russian crude oil, refined petroleum products and gaseous hydrocarbons, as well as the export of goods related to oil exploration and production and related services. Canada also prohibits the provision of services related to the marine transport of oil purchased above the oil price cap. Finally, Canada prohibits a wide range of services from being provided in relation to the Russian energy, manufacturing and transportation sectors.

Since 2022, Canada’s Russia Regulations have banned certain ships from docking in or passing through Canada. This applies to ships registered in Russia or used, leased or chartered, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia, a person in Russia or a listed person. This prohibition aims to prevent Russia from benefitting from maritime trade with Canada. In February 2025, Canada amended the Russia Regulations by adding a new schedule containing a list of ships that are believed to be transporting or have transported property or goods on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia or a person in Russia. In June 2025, the Russia Regulations were further amended to include an additional prohibition on the provision of financial services or any other services to any person outside Canada who is not Canadian, where the services relate to a ship listed in Schedule 1.1 of the Russia Regulations.

In coordination with like-minded partners, Canada has recently identified several individuals, entities and vessels that are engaged in activities, including cyber operations, linked to Russia’s military base, its hybrid strategy against Ukraine and its shadow fleet operations.

Objective

  1. Constrain Russia’s ability to fund its conventional military and hybrid capabilities used in its war of aggression against Ukraine, to support Ukraine and reinforce Canada’s commitment to international security and the rule of law.
  2. Further increase the economic costs to Russia for its war against Ukraine by targeting its energy revenues and financial enablers.

Description

The amendments

The ships listed have been involved in the transport of goods, such as crude oil, LNG, or arms and related material, on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia or a person in Russia.

These amendments further align Canada’s measures with G7 and like-minded partners by expanding sanctions on the energy, financial and maritime sectors to further isolate Russia economically and strategically, including targeting enablers and profiteers in Russian and third-country financial sectors.

Any person in Canada or Canadians outside Canada are prohibited from dealing in the property of, entering into transactions with, providing services to, transferring property to, or otherwise making goods available to listed individuals and entities (persons), unless explicitly authorized by a permit granted on an exceptional basis or an exception in the Russia Regulations. Listed individuals are also rendered inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

Under the Russia Regulations, listed persons may apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have their name removed from the Schedule of designated persons. The Minister must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to make a recommendation to the Governor in Council for removal. Information on the delisting application process is available on Global Affairs Canada’s website.

Regulatory development

Consultation

Global Affairs Canada regularly engages with relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations and cultural communities and other like-minded governments regarding Canada’s approach to sanctions implementation.

New sanctions measures are not prepublished in the Canada Gazette, Part I, and public consultation would not have been appropriate for these amendments. Publicizing the names of the listed persons targeted by sanctions could have resulted in asset flight and sanctions evasion prior to the coming into force of the amendments, which could compromise Canada’s foreign policy objectives.

Indigenous engagement, consultation and modern treaty obligations

In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on the Federal Approach to Modern Treaty Implementation, an analysis was undertaken to determine whether the amendments are likely to give rise to modern treaty obligations. The assessment examined the geographic scope and subject matter of the amendments in relation to modern treaties in effect, and no modern treaty obligations were identified.

Instrument choice

The imposition of sanctions against foreign states and non-state actors is a key tool for the international community to support peace and security and enforce international norms and laws. The Parliament of Canada has enacted legislation authorizing the imposition of sanctions through the United Nations Act, the SEMA, and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law).

Canada has established a rigorous due diligence process to consider and evaluate possible cases that may warrant the use of sanctions. Given the elements in the amendments, the SEMA was identified as the instrument of choice.

Sanctions measures under the SEMA are imposed by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, through a regulatory process. Regulations are therefore the only available legal instrument for the amendments. No other instrument could be considered.

Regulatory analysis

Benefits and costs

These amendments to the Russia Regulations will strengthen existing economic measures against Russia, constrain Russia’s ability to finance and resource its unjustified war in Ukraine and discourage individuals and entities from contributing, directly or indirectly, to Russia’s war efforts. By imposing these sanctions, Canada signals its strong condemnation of Russia’s ongoing behaviour.

The incremental cost to the Government of Canada to administer and enforce these additional prohibitions will be minimal. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and other departments and agencies will incur a small cost to ensure their relevant systems include the persons and vessels listed through this amendment.

Canadian banks and financial institutions are required to comply with sanctions. They will do so by adding the newly listed individuals, entities and ships to their existing monitoring systems, which will also result in a minor compliance cost. As of August 2024, financial institutions must report transactions suspected of being related to sanctions evasion to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). Financial institutions also have other legal obligations with respect to the monitoring and reporting of relevant property ownership, export and import of goods and other activities in connection with sanctioned individuals and entities.

Sanctions targeting specific persons have less impact on Canadian businesses than traditional broad-based economic sanctions. Based on an initial assessment of available open-source information and consultations within the Government of Canada, it is believed that the individuals and entities listed in the amendments have limited linkages with Canada and, therefore, do not have business dealings that are significant to the Canadian economy. It is therefore anticipated that there will be no significant impacts on Canadians or Canadian businesses as a result of these amendments.

The amendments related to the listing of vessels are also not expected to result in incremental impacts on Canada. Since 2022, the Russia Regulations have banned certain ships from docking in or passing through Canada. This applies to all ships registered in Russia or used, leased or chartered, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia, a person in Russia or a listed person. While the amendments do not introduce new prohibitions, listing the 100 identified vessels will facilitate the enforcement of the general prohibition on docking and passage in Canada. Without the names of the vessels in the Schedule, enforcement authorities must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a vessel is subject to the general prohibition. The Schedule provides a predetermination of status for a category of vessels that can be used to identify them for purposes of denying them docking and passage.

In relation to the prohibition on the provision of services to vessels, all Canadian companies providing services related to vessels, such as insurance, technical services or ship supply services, will be required to screen against Schedule 1.1, to ensure that they are not providing a service in relation to a listed vessel. There is no data available to ascertain if any Canadian businesses are currently providing services in relation to listed vessels. However, Global Affairs Canada has concluded that it is highly unlikely that any Canadian businesses currently provide such services, as there is no record of these vessels entering Canada, and none of the vessels are owned, managed, operated or insured by Canadian companies.

Small business lens

Analysis under the small business lens concludes that the amendments will not impact Canadian small businesses, as it is highly unlikely that Canadian businesses have dealings with the individuals, entities and/or vessels included in the amendments.

Canadian businesses may seek permits under the Special Economic Measures Permit Authorization Order to allow them to perform a specified activity with a listed person. Those permits are granted on an exceptional basis. However, Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any applications resulting from listing these persons or ships, as the department’s assessment has not identified business dealings that are significant to Canada’s economy.

Canadian small businesses are also subject to the duty to disclose under the Russia Regulations, which would represent a direct compliance requirement. However, as the newly listed individuals, entities and ships have no known legitimate linkages with Canada, Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any disclosures resulting from the amendments.

One-for-one rule

The one-for-one rule does not apply, as there is no incremental change in administrative burden on business. The permitting process for businesses meets the definition of “administrative burden” in the Red Tape Reduction Act. However, while permits may be granted under the Special Economic Measures Permit Authorization Order on an exceptional basis, given the minimal level of trade with Russia, Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any permit applications with respect to the amendments.

Regulatory cooperation and alignment

While the amendments are not related to a work plan or commitment under a formal regulatory cooperation forum, they align with actions taken by Canada’s partners and like-minded partners. Sanctions are most effective when they are applied in a coordinated manner, and Canada is working to harmonize efforts internally and with partners to facilitate a unified front on sanctions.

Canada’s international partners continue to update their sanctions regimes against individuals and entities in Russia and enforce far-reaching financial, trade and investment prohibitions on Russia. Countries and jurisdictions that have sanctioned individuals and entities related to Russia’s gross and systematic violations of human rights and its infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity include Australia, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The persons and vessels listed in the amendments have been subject to sanctions by like-minded nations. These measures also align with Canada’s commitment following the signature of the United Kingdom-led call to action on the shadow fleet. In addition, the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom all prohibit wider categories of activity, including services in relation to listed ships.

International obligations

Compliance with Canada’s international commitments was considered in the development of these amendments.

Effects on the environment

The amendments are unlikely to result in important environmental effects. In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on Strategic Environmental and Economic Assessment (SEEA Directive), a preliminary scan concluded that a strategic environmental and economic assessment is not required.

Gender-based analysis plus

A gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) concluded that the amendments are unlikely to result in differential impacts on the basis of identity factors, including but not limited to gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and religion.

The subject of economic sanctions has previously been assessed for effects on gender and diversity. Although intended to facilitate a change in behaviour through economic pressure on individuals and entities in foreign states, sanctions under the SEMA can nevertheless have an unintended impact on certain vulnerable groups and individuals. Rather than affecting Russia as a whole, these targeted sanctions impact individuals believed to be engaged in activities that directly or indirectly support, provide funding for or contribute to a violation of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine. Therefore, these sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact on vulnerable groups as compared to traditional broad-based economic sanctions directed toward a state. Insofar as sanctions limit Russia’s ability to wage war, individuals and groups vulnerable to gender-based discrimination are likely to benefit from these measures.

Implementation, compliance and enforcement, and service standards

The amendments come into force on the day they are registered.

Consequential to being listed in the Russia Regulations, and pursuant to the application of paragraph 35.1(b) of the IRPA, the listed individuals would be inadmissible to Canada.

The names of the listed individuals and entities will be available online for financial institutions to review and will be added to the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. This will help persons in Canada and Canadians outside of Canada to comply with the amendments.

The Trade Commissioner Service at Global Affairs Canada, both abroad and in Canada, continues to assist clients in understanding Canadian sanctions regulations, notably the impact of these regulations on any activities in which Canadians may be engaged. Global Affairs Canada is also increasing outreach efforts across Canada through presentations and other events, including engagement with businesses, universities and provincial and territorial governments, to enhance national awareness of and compliance with Canadian sanctions.

The prohibitions on ships entering or passing through Canada are enforced by a multi-departmental process involving, among others, Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, the CBSA and the RCMP. These partners were consulted in the development of the amendments.

Under the SEMA, both RCMP and CBSA officers have the power to enforce sanctions measures through their authorities as defined under the Customs Act, the Excise Act or the Excise Act, 2001, and sections 487 to 490, 491.1 and 491.2 of the Criminal Code.

In accordance with section 8 of the SEMA, every person who knowingly contravenes or fails to comply with the Russia Regulations is liable, upon summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both, or, upon conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

Contact

Global Affairs Canada
Sanctions Bureau
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0G2
Email: sanctions@international.gc.ca
Telephone (toll-free): 1‑833‑352‑0769
Telephone (local): 343‑203‑3975
Fax: 613‑995‑9085