Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations: SOR/2025-33

Canada Gazette, Part II, Volume 159, Number 6

Registration
SOR/2025-33 February 21, 2025

SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES ACT

P.C. 2025-155 February 21, 2025

Whereas the Governor in Council is of the opinion that the actions of the Russian Federation constitute a grave breach of international peace and security that has resulted in a serious international crisis;

Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes the annexed Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations under paragraph 4(1)(a)footnote a and subsections 4(1.1)footnote b, (2)footnote c and (3) of the Special Economic Measures Act footnote d.

Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations

Amendments

1 Section 1 of the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations footnote 1 is amended by adding the following in alphabetical order:

IMO number
means the unique seven-digit ship identification number required by regulation XI-1/3 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974. (numéro OMI)

2 The Regulations are amended by adding the following after section 2:

Schedule 1.1

2.01 A ship whose IMO number is listed in Schedule 1.1 is a ship in respect of which the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe is transporting or has transported property or goods on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia or a person in Russia.

3 Section 3.04 of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Ships

3.04 It is prohibited for any person to dock any of the following ships in Canada or to pass any of the following ships through Canada, unless that docking or passage is necessary to safeguard human life or to ensure navigational safety:

4 The marginal note to section 3.05 of the Regulations is replaced by “Petroleum oils and gases”.

5 (1) Subsection 8(1) of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Application to no longer be listed

8 (1) A person may apply in writing to the Minister

(2) Subsection 8(2) of the English version of the Regulations is replaced by the following:

Recommendation

(2) On receipt of the application, the Minister must decide whether there are reasonable grounds to recommend the removal to the Governor in Council.

6 Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following in numerical order:

7 Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following in numerical order:

8 The Regulations are amended by adding, after Schedule 1, the Schedule 1.1 set out in the schedule to these Regulations.

9 (1) Items 38.1 to 38.4, 39.1 and 39.2 of Schedule 7 to the Regulations are repealed.

(2) Schedule 7 to the Regulations is amended by adding the following after item 37:
Item

Column 1

Goods

Column 2

Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System codefootnote a
38 Ball or roller bearings 8482

Application Before Publication

10 For the purpose of paragraph 11(2)(a) of the Statutory Instruments Act, these Regulations apply according to their terms before they are published in the Canada Gazette.

Coming into Force

11 These Regulations come into force on the day on which they are registered.

SCHEDULE

(Section 8)

SCHEDULE 1.1

(Section 2.01 and paragraphs 3.04(b) and 8(1)(b))

Ships
Item IMO number Vessel name Type Build date
1 7612448 Balitiyskiy III General Cargo / Multi Purpose 1980
2 8846814 Musa Jalil General Cargo / Multi Purpose 1989
3 8858087 Skif V General Cargo / Multi Purpose 1984
4 8889385 Omskiy 103 General Cargo / Multi Purpose 1978
5 8943210 Begey General Cargo / Multi Purpose 1985
6 9144782 Bodhi Oil Tanker 1997
7 9161003 Lady R Ro-Ro Cargo 2004
8 9179842 Angara Ro-Ro Cargo 1998
9 9216298 East Energy LNG Tanker 2002
10 9232888 Ksena Oil Tanker 2003
11 9243148 Everest Energy LNG Tanker 2003
12 9248801 Mu Dan Oil Tanker 2003
13 9249130 Peace Oil Tanker 2004
14 9250531 Python Oil Tanker 2004
15 9250543 Neomi Oil Tanker 2004
16 9250892 Mikati Oil Tanker 2003
17 9253325 Nurkez Oil Tanker 2004
18 9255660 Pontus I Oil Tanker 2004
19 9256602 Pioneer LNG Tanker 2005
20 9257022 Laconia Oil Tanker 2003
21 9258868 Asher Oil Tanker 2003
22 9259185 Daksha Oil Tanker 2005
23 9271951 Facca Chemical/Products Tanker 2005
24 9274434 Sindhu Oil Tanker 2003
25 9281011 Moti Oil Tanker 2004
26 9282479 Minerva M Oil Tanker 2005
27 9285835 Sea Fidelity Oil Tanker 2005
28 9285859 Eastern Pearl Oil Tanker 2006
29 9286657 Lokosao Oil Tanker 2005
30 9288693 Andaman Skies Oil Tanker 2004
31 9288708 Stratos Aurora Oil Tanker 2005
32 9288710 Kudos Stars Oil Tanker 2005
33 9288722 Azure Celeste Oil Tanker 2005
34 9288746 Udaya Oil Tanker 2005
35 9288899 Lorena Grand Oil Tanker 2005
36 9289520 N Cerna Chemical/Products Tanker 2005
37 9289752 Savitri Products Tanker 2005
38 9290309 Hulda Oil Tanker 2004
39 9292204 Andromeda Oil Tanker 2005
40 9292503 Bull Oil Tanker 2005
41 9292981 Sagar Violet Oil Tanker 2004
42 9293155 Junia Oil Tanker 2005
43 9296391 Peta Lumina Oil Tanker 2006
44 9296822 Sagitta Oil Tanker 2005
45 9297371 Suleyman I Oil Tanker 2006
46 9299666 Dashan Oil Tanker 2005
47 9299692 Callisto Oil Tanker 2005
48 9299721 Leona Oil Tanker 2006
49 9299733 Nagarjuna Oil Tanker 2006
50 9299898 Turbo Voyager Oil Tanker 2005
51 9305568 Breeze Oil Tanker 2005
52 9306794 Constellation Oil Tanker 2006
53 9311622 Vanguard Oil Tanker 2006
54 9312884 Kemerovo Oil Tanker 2007
55 9312896 Krasnoyarsk Oil Tanker 2007
56 9314167 Agnes Oil Tanker 2007
57 9316127 Vega Oil Tanker 2007
58 9317949 Xiwang Oil Tanker 2007
59 9318539 Swiftsea Rider Oil Tanker 2007
60 9319882 Aryabhata Oil Tanker 2007
61 9321689 Ocean Faye Oil Tanker 2007
62 9321691 Sai Baba Oil Tanker 2006
63 9321847 Emily S Oil Tanker 2006
64 9323986 Garasan Oil Tanker 2007
65 9324277 Nova Energy LNG Tanker 2007
66 9331141 Kelly Grace Oil Tanker 2006
67 9331153 Delvina Oil Tanker 2007
68 9332781 Lang Ya Oil Tanker 2006
69 9332810 Kiwala Oil Tanker 2007
70 9333424 Phoenix Oil Products Tanker 2007
71 9333436 Success Oil Products Tanker 2007
72 9339325 Liberty Oil Tanker 2007
73 9339337 Legacy Oil Tanker 2008
74 9341079 Capella Oil Tanker 2006
75 9341081 Cassiopeia Oil Tanker 2006
76 9341093 Kolomna Oil Tanker 2006
77 9353096 Madhav Chemical/Products Tanker 2008
78 9354313 Zaliv Amurskiy Oil Tanker 2008
79 9394935 Ozanno Oil Tanker 2008
80 9402471 Apar Oil Tanker 2009
81 9408205 Fast Kathy Oil Tanker 2010
82 9410870 HS Everett Oil Tanker 2008
83 9410894 Valour Oil Tanker 2009
84 9411020 Bratsk Oil Tanker 2009
85 9412335 Bolero Oil Tanker 2010
86 9412347 Leo Oil Tanker 2011
87 9412359 Belgorod Oil Tanker 2010
88 9413547 Altair Oil Tanker 2009
89 9413559 Antarktika Oil Tanker 2009
90 9413561 Alliance Oil Tanker 2009
91 9413573 Atlas Oil Tanker 2009
92 9418494 Zaliv Aniva Oil Tanker 2009
93 9421972 Saturn Oil Tanker 2010
94 9422457 Blossom Oil Tanker 2010
95 9436941 Yi Meng Shan Oil Tanker 2010
96 9481910 Port Olya 3 General Cargo / Multi Purpose 2011
97 9511387 Olympus Oil Tanker 2010
98 9511521 Meridian Oil Tanker 2010
99 9522324 Sierra Oil Tanker 2011
100 9610781 Zenith Oil Tanker 2012
101 9610793 Georgy Maslov Oil Tanker 2012
102 9610808 Anatoly Kolodkin Oil Tanker 2013
103 9610810 Viktor Bakaev Oil Tanker 2013
104 9630004 Velikiy Novgorod LNG Tanker 2014
105 9778313 Marshal Vasilevskiy FSO Gas Unit 2018
106 9826902 Galaxy Oil Tanker 2019
107 9849887 La Perouse LNG Tanker 2020
108 9864837 Mulan LNG Tanker 2024
109 9953523 North Sky LNG Tanker 2024

REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS STATEMENT

(This statement is not part of the Regulation.)

Issues

Background

Situation in Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, Russia began a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, launching attacks on many cities. Russia continues to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine, and to commit atrocities against Ukrainians.

Experts, including from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Moscow Mechanism fact-finding missions, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have concluded that Russia is committing serious human rights violations, war crimes, possible crimes against humanity and conflict-related sexual violence. As of January 2025, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has confirmed that at least 12 456 civilians have been killed and over 28 382 were injured since February 24, 2022. Furthermore, 660 medical facilities and 1 275 educational facilities in Ukraine have been damaged or destroyed by Russia’s military since the invasion.

“Filtration points” were established on Russian-held Ukrainian territory that the Russian regime uses to triage Ukrainians based on connection to the Ukrainian state. Open sources such as the BBC report that journalists and those with connections to Ukraine’s military are targeted and are subject to interrogation and torture. President Putin’s military invasion has also been paired with significant malicious cyber operations and disinformation campaigns that falsely portray the West as the aggressor, falsely claiming that Ukraine is developing chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear weapons with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support.

The forced displacement of Ukrainian children has been a central concern since the Russian 2014 invasion and has increasingly gained media attention since the outbreak of the full-scale war in 2022. Thousands of Ukrainian children are reported to have been illegally deported or forcibly transferred to facilities in Russia and Russian-held Ukrainian territory. To date, only a few hundred children have successfully returned to Ukraine from Russia.

Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine seeks to shape domestic and international perceptions in Russia’s favour. The regime achieves this by using various disinformation techniques, ranging from misleading narratives about the conflict’s origins to outright denial of Russia’s actions on the ground. The coalition of countries supporting Ukraine, including the G7 and European countries, is engaging in intense diplomacy to support Ukraine across a number of areas, including combatting Russian disinformation. Specifically, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism is strengthening G7 coordination to identify and respond to foreign threats to democracies, such as disinformation.

The export of sensitive technologies to Russia has become a critical issue, as these technologies can bolster Russia’s military capabilities and undermine the effectiveness of international sanctions. Despite extensive export controls and other economic measures imposed by Canada and international partner governments, Russia has exploited illicit networks and third countries to acquire advanced technologies, including dual-use items with both civilian and military applications. These technologies are crucial for maintaining Russia’s weapons systems, allowing it to continue perpetrating its illegal war.

There is a historically unprecedented volume of sanctions on Russia, its key industries and resources, and perpetrators and supporters of the war in Ukraine. Russian officials, individuals and entities have deployed various methods to circumvent these prohibitions. They have used logistics companies — including airline companies — to transport prohibited goods from third countries and set up businesses in third countries to facilitate this evasion. Of note, Russia is heavily reliant on its oil and gas resources to fund the war, making regulations and restrictions on this industry critical to curtailing Russia’s access to funds and resources.

The Russian “shadow fleet,” a network of vessels and various supporting entities around the world, used to transport sanctioned goods and commodities, is central to Russia’s efforts to evade or otherwise circumvent sanctions. These vessels often intentionally disable or manipulate their automatic identification systems, have substandard maintenance, unclear ownership, inadequate insurance coverage, and engage in dangerous ship-to-ship transfers. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution A.1192(33), “Urging Member States and All Relevant Stakeholders to Promote Actions to Prevent Illegal Operations in the Maritime Sector by the ‘Dark Fleet’ or ‘Shadow Fleet,’” calls on states to take a range of actions to prevent this type of activity. Canada has signed a United Kingdom-led “Call to Action” on the shadow fleet, which has been signed by 50 other states. The international coalition supporting Ukraine has increased efforts to counter the shadow fleet by enhancing maritime surveillance, sanctioning vessels involved, and undertaking outreach with industry, flag states and port states.

Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine violates international law, jeopardizes stability in the region and puts countless innocent lives at risk. It also threatens the values and principles that underpin the rules-based international system, including every state’s right to sovereignty and self-determination. Canada is steadfast in its commitment to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and its efforts towards a just and sustainable peace. Alongside international partner governments, Canada has unequivocally condemned Russia’s illegal and egregious actions.

International response

The coalition of countries supporting Ukraine includes, but is not limited to, the G7 and European countries. This group is working to support Ukraine across a number of areas, including by contributing to energy security, nuclear safety, food security, humanitarian assistance, combatting Russian disinformation, imposing sanctions and economic measures, asset seizure and forfeiture, military assistance, ensuring accountability and fostering socio-economic recovery and reconstruction.

Certain countries have not participated in sanctions efforts targeting Russia in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and appear to be directly and indirectly supplying goods and services that would otherwise be prohibited by coordinated international sanctions.

Canada’s response

Following Russia’s illegal occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Government of Canada, in tandem with partners and allies, enacted sanctions through the regulations under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA). These sanctions impose dealings prohibitions (an effective asset freeze) on listed individuals and entities supporting or enabling Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Any person in Canada and Canadians outside Canada is prohibited from dealing in the property of, entering into transactions with, providing services to, or otherwise making goods available to persons listed under schedules 1, 2 or 3 of the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (the Russia Regulations).

In total, Canada has committed over $19.5 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, development, security, stabilization and immigration assistance in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Canada remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s stability, security and sovereignty, as it resists Russia’s war of aggression.

Since 2014, in coordination with its partners, Canada has imposed sanctions on over 3 000 individuals and entities in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, linked to their support of the illegal invasion of Ukraine. In addition, Canada has implemented targeted restrictions against Russia and Belarus in financial, trade (goods and services), energy and transport sectors. Canada is part of the Oil Price Cap Coalition, the G7 diamond import ban and ongoing efforts to use the proceeds from Russian sovereign assets to help Ukraine.

Unlawful deportation and forced transfer of Ukrainian children

Canada is the co-chair of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, which was launched in Kyiv, Ukraine, on February 2, 2024. Canada is working closely with Ukraine to support dialogue and information exchange and to coordinate key messages between key stakeholders on this issue.

On October 30 and 31, 2024, Canada co-hosted the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine’s 10-Point Peace Formula (a formula that respects the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the UN Charter, and international law) in Montréal with the Ukrainian and Norwegian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. At the conference, the ministers announced the Montréal Pledge, concrete steps to help return prisoners of war, unlawfully detained civilians and deported children, including support as these people reintegrate into their daily lives.

Disinformation and propaganda agents

Canada is a leader in the international effort to counter disinformation. Canada has established Rapid Response Mechanism Canada, the permanent secretariat to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, which is a team dedicated to understanding, monitoring and detecting Russian and other state-sponsored disinformation. Through diplomacy, Canada will continue to raise awareness of state-sponsored information manipulation operations and coordinate international responses to foreign threats to democracy. Sanctions are also central to these coordinated efforts to counter Russian hybrid warfare, in which state-generated disinformation is an essential component. Canada’s sanctions have targeted over 150 Russian disinformation agents to date, sending a strong signal that there are consequences to manipulating and distorting information. This pioneering effort has been recognized and leveraged by Canada’s like-minded partners.

Sanctions circumvention in third countries

In order to address sanctions evasion, Canada amended the Russia Regulations in February 2024 to strengthen its sanctions regime by allowing the listing of persons in third countries complicit in the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including persons that help Russia to evade or circumvent sanctions measures. The NATO Washington Summit Declaration included significant references to specific states — the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran — that enable Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Oil and gas

Canada and G7 partners have sought to limit Russian access to revenue from the oil and natural gas sector. Canada prohibits the import of any Russian crude oil, refined petroleum products and gaseous hydrocarbons, as well as the export of goods related to oil exploration and production and related services. Canada also prohibits the provision of services related to the marine transport of oil purchased above the oil price cap. Finally, Canada prohibits a wide range of services from being provided in relation to the Russian energy, manufacturing and transportation sectors.

Prohibitions on vessels

Several countries including Canada have put in place prohibitions on different categories of ships linked to Russia from entering their ports. Since 2022, Canada’s Russia Regulations have banned certain ships from docking in or passing through Canada. This applies to ships registered in Russia or used, leased or chartered, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia, a person in Russia or a listed person. This prohibition aims to prevent Russia from benefitting from maritime trade with Canada.

Sensitive technology

Canada’s Restricted Goods and Technologies List (RGTL) serves as a vital tool in preventing the unauthorized export of sensitive goods and technologies. The list identifies items that are subject to trade prohibitions due to their potential military applications or strategic value. In parallel to these amendments, the RGTL, which is referenced in the Russia Regulations, is being updated and expanded to prohibit a wider range of sensitive goods and technologies from being exported to Russia.

Objective

These measures aim to

Description

Amendments to the list of sanctioned persons

The amendments add 32 individuals and 44 entities to Schedule 1 of the Russia Regulations.

These persons include

Any person in Canada or Canadian outside Canada is thereby prohibited from dealing in the property of, entering into transactions with, providing services to, transferring property to, or otherwise making goods available to listed individuals and entities (persons) — unless explicitly authorized by a permit granted on an exceptional basis or an exception in the Russia Regulations. These measures will also render listed individuals inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Under the Russia Regulations, listed persons may apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have their name removed from the Schedule of designated persons. The Minister must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to make a recommendation to the Governor in Council for removal.

Amendments to strengthen existing prohibitions on ships

The amendments add a new Schedule 1.1 containing a list of ships to improve enforcement of the existing docking and passage prohibition in Section 3.04. To combat efforts to evade the restrictions by frequently changing names, the ships are being listed by their International Maritime Organisation number (IMO number). The new criterion added to Section 2.01 provides that the ships added to Schedule 1.1 are those where the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister, is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe are transporting or have transported property or goods on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia or a person in Russia.

A new provision will be made to allow applications to the Minister under the Russia Regulations to have ships removed from the schedule. Upon receipt of an application, the Minister must decide whether there are reasonable grounds to recommend to the Governor in Council that the ship’s IMO number be removed.

The amendments add an initial list of 109 vessels to Schedule 1.1. The ships listed in this amendment have been involved in the transport of goods (such as crude oil, Liquified Natural Gas, or arms and related material) on behalf of or for the benefit of Russia or a person in Russia. All of these ships have been subject to sanctions by at least one of the United States, United Kingdom or European Union.

Amendments to other prohibitions

The title of the existing prohibition in Section 3.05 related to petroleum oils and gases is being amended to clarify that it applies equally to Liquified Natural Gas (LNG).

Additional amendments are being made to certain HS codes in Schedule 7, which contains a list of goods subject to the prohibition in Section 3.09 on goods used for the manufacture of weapons. Previous versions of the Schedule contained HS codes at both the two- and six-digit level (item 38) and at the four- and six-digit level (item 39). To facilitate its effective implementation, items 38 and 39 will be amended to clarify that the prohibitions apply at the highest digit HS code included in the Schedule.

Regulatory development

Consultation

Global Affairs Canada regularly engages with relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations, cultural communities and other like-minded governments, regarding Canada’s approach to sanctions implementation.

With respect to the amendments adding individuals and entities and proposing modifications under the current package, public consultation would not be appropriate. Publicizing the names of the persons targeted by sanctions would have potentially resulted in asset flight prior to the coming into force of the amendments.

Modern treaty obligations and Indigenous engagement and consultation

An initial assessment of the geographical scope of the initiative was conducted and did not identify any modern treaty obligations, as the amendments do not take effect in a modern treaty area.

Instrument choice

Regulations are the sole method to enact sanctions in Canada. No other instrument could be considered.

Regulatory analysis

Benefits and costs

The measures included in this package strengthen existing economic measures against Russia, constrain their ability to finance and resource its illegal war, and hold individuals and entities accountable for actions that contribute to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Based on an initial assessment of available open-source information, it is anticipated that there will not be significant impacts on Canadians and Canadian businesses as a result of these amendments.

The new Schedule of specific vessels will provide the benefit of facilitating enforcement of the general prohibition on docking and passage in Canada. Without the Schedule, enforcement authorities must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a vessel is subject to the general prohibition. The Schedule provides a predetermination of status for a category of vessels that can be used to identify them for purposes of denying them docking and passage.

Canadian banks and financial institutions are required to comply with sanctions. They will do so by adding the newly listed individuals and entities to their existing monitoring systems, which may result in a minor compliance cost.

Small business lens

Analysis under the small business lens concludes that the amendments could impact Canadians small businesses. The amendments listing new individuals and entities do not impose any new compliance or administrative burden on small businesses in Canada. These amendments prohibit Canadian businesses from dealing with, providing services to, or otherwise making goods available to listed persons, but do not create obligations related to them.

Canadian businesses may seek permits under the Russia Regulations which are granted on an exceptional basis allowing policy space for exemptions. However, Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any applications resulting from listing these persons or technologies. Canadian small businesses are also subject to the duty to disclose under the Russia Regulations, which would represent a direct compliance requirement. However, as the newly listed persons have no known legitimate linkages with Canada, Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any disclosures resulting from the amendments.

One-for-one rule

The one-for-one rule does not apply as there is no incremental change in administrative burden on businesses. The permitting process for businesses meets the definition of “administrative burden” in the Red Tape Reduction Act; however, while permits may be granted under the Russia Regulations, on an exceptional basis, given the minimal level of trade with Russia, Global Affairs Canada does not anticipate any permit applications with respect to the amendments.

Regulatory cooperation and alignment

While the amendments are not related to a work plan or commitment under a formal regulatory cooperation forum, they align with actions taken by Canada’s partners and like-minded. Sanctions are most effective when they are applied in a coordinated manner and Canada is working to harmonize efforts internally, and with partners, to facilitate a unified front on sanctions.

Canada’s international partners continue to update their sanction regimes against individuals and entities in Russia and enforce far-reaching financial, trade and investment prohibitions on Russia. Countries and jurisdictions that have sanctioned individuals and entities related to Russia’s military efforts, including circumvention and disinformation, include Australia, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Recent discussions among like-minded governments have reflected the need to target Russian sanctions circumvention and war efforts through targeting of logistics, oil and gas sectors, and third country support for Russia. These amendments align with these objectives.

Effects on the environment

The amendments are unlikely to result in important environmental effects. In accordance with the Cabinet Directive on Strategic Environmental and Economic Assessment (SEEA Directive), a preliminary scan concluded that a SEEA is not required.

Gender-based analysis plus

The subject of economic sanctions has previously been assessed for effects on gender and diversity. Although intended to facilitate a change in behaviour through economic pressure on individuals and entities in foreign states, sanctions under the SEMA can nevertheless have an unintended impact on certain vulnerable groups and individuals. Rather than affecting Russia as a whole, these targeted sanctions impact individuals believed to be engaged in activities that directly or indirectly support, provide funding for or contribute to a violation of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine. Therefore, these sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact on vulnerable groups as compared to traditional broad-based economic sanctions directed toward a state. In so far as sanctions limit Russia’s ability to wage war, women, children and vulnerable groups are likely to benefit from these measures.

Implementation, compliance and enforcement, and service standards

The amendments come into force on the day they are registered.

Consequential to being listed in the Russia Regulations, and pursuant to the application of paragraph 35.1(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the listed individuals would be inadmissible to Canada.

The names of the listed individuals, entities and ships will be available online for financial institutions and other stakeholders to review and will be added to the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. This will help to facilitate compliance with the Russia Regulations.

The Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) at Global Affairs Canada, abroad and in Canada, continues to assist clients in understanding Canadian sanctions regulations, and notably the impact of the regulations on any activities in which Canadians may be engaged. Global Affairs Canada is also increasing outreach efforts across Canada — including to engage with businesses, universities, and provincial/territorial governments — to enhance national awareness of and compliance with Canadian sanctions.

Global Affairs Canada collaborates with the Canada Border Services Agency for effective enforcement, activating a border lookout when a new prohibition is implemented, as they possess the essential on-the-ground expertise for enforcement to ensure exports do not flow to Russia directly or via third countries.

The prohibitions on ships entering or passing through Canada, including the new list of specific ships, are enforced by a multi-departmental process involving Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and others.

Under the SEMA, both the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canada Border Services Agency officers have the power to enforce sanctions violations through their authorities as defined under the Customs Act, the Excise Act or the Excise Act, 2001, and sections 487 to 490, 491.1 and 491.2 of the Criminal Code.

In accordance with section 8 of the SEMA, every person who knowingly contravenes or fails to comply with the Russia Regulations is liable, upon summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both: or, upon conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

Contact

Sanctions Bureau
Global Affairs Canada
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0G2
Telephone (toll-free): 833‑352‑0769
Telephone (local): 343‑203‑3975
Fax: 613‑995‑9085
Email: sanctions@international.gc.ca